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Abstract
The Existentialist: Philosopher and/or Artist
A Justification of Literary Art Forms as an Alternate Means
of Philosophic Expression
The crux of the thesis demonstrates two related 
points: first, that the existentialists are justified in 
using different means of expression: and consequently, that 
criticism directed at the existentialist's usage of different 
forms of expression is unfounded. It was noticed that the 
existentialist is frequently referred to as a neurotic, 
morbid novelist/artist. It was assumed that such criticism 
does not constitute a valid argument against the existential 
philosophies.
The first part of this thesis was organized to answer 
the following claim: if Existentialism, as a philosophy, is 
adequately different from what is normally perceived as 
traditional philosophy, then this difference supports the 
decision to use an alternate means of expression. This 
response focussed on the issues of content and purpose. If 
the content of the existential philosophies has concerns 
which are substantially different, then this also supports 
the crux of the thesis. Content was demonstrated by 
establishing the following: a working definition of 
existentialism; a first category of characteristic* (the 
logical implications of what was deemed the main tenet: 
existence precedes essence); a second category of 
characteristics (how the individual addresses these
implications). The issue of purpose was handled in a similar 
fashion.
In the second part, the literary art forms were 
examined. The claim is : if art forms (such as the novel and 
the drama) can satisfy the requirements of traditional 
philosophy, and are also beneficial to the expression of the 
existential philosophies, then this also supports the crux of 
the thesis. For art forms to be an acceptable expression of 
philosophy, the following was demonstrated: the capacity for 
knowledge (truth from literature); a compatibility with the 
content and purpose of the existential philosophies; and 
also, any other beneficial qualities (such as practical 
concerns). These criteria had to be met without compromising 
what was acceptable for the particular art form being used. 
That is, if the nature of the art form was altered to 
incorporate the existential philosophies, then the union 
would not be successful. This section focussed on the novel 
and the drama, to determine which, if either or both, 
satisfies these criteria.
In the third part, a refutation of the chief concerns 
raised regarding the legitimacy of art forma as an alternate 
means of philosophic expression was presented. These concerns 
can be classified as the following: imagination (as distinct 
from cognitive & rational processes); metaphor (problems with 
ambiguity & obscurity); and also, the role of the artist in 
contrast with role of the philosopher (problems with 
stereotypical thinking).
If these concerns have been reasonably addressed, the 
these certain art forms have been justified as an alternate 
means of philosophic expression in regard to Existentialism, 
and consequently, the arguments against the existential 
philosophies which are directed at his choice of expression 
are invalid.
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Introduction
In this work, it will be determined to what extent, if 
at all, the existentialist is justified in employing various 
forms of the literary arts as an alternate means of 
expression. The existentialist mixes philosophy with art: 
this gives him the dubious position of an artist philosophsr. 
The existentialist's combination is often employed as an 
argument to lower his position in the hierarchy of 
philosophic thought. If his philosophy is something which 
necessarily requires an alternate means of expression, then 
it seems that the existentialist was correct to do so. This 
would give the artist philosopher credence.
Due to the modern philosopher's emphasis on 
clarification, the existentialist's connection with the 
literary arts has been perceived as somewhat regressive. But, 
the existential philosophies have, from the beginning, 
closely associated themselves with the literary modes of 
expression; from short stories to novels, and more pointedly, 
for the focus of this work, with the dramatic performance of 
the theatre. He does this for a reason: he finds fault with 
the traditional forms employed by philosophers.
If the existentialist denounces the superiority of 
analytic methods, then to be consistent, he should choose and 
advocate a better vehicle of expression. This work proposes 
that this is what he has done with his decision to express 
his philosophy through the literary arts. In particular, the
theatre, seemingly, has given the existentialist his best 
vehicle of expression. The existentialist claims to dethrone 
the rationalist method as the sole means of philosophical 
thinking, and if this is his claim, then how can he rightly 
use this same analytic method to announce its inadequacies? 
Twentieth century philosophers have attempted to exclude the 
human element from logic, but the existentialist believes 
such an endeavor is a mistake. However, he expressed his 
reservations in an alternate means (e.g. a literary art form) 
which left the other philosophy scholars both frustrated and 
skeptical of the existentialist.
The existentialist's move away from traditional 
rational analysis to the use of the dramatic stage was, in 
the beginning, also poorly received by the dramatists. It 
seems that both disciplines, philosophy and drama, were in 
agreement: the existentialist's approach was misplaced. 
Philosophers do philosophy; dramatists do drama. If the 
existentialist is a philosopher, then let him do philosophy. 
His ideas do not belong on the stage. The proper format for 
the exegesis of the existentialist's philosophy was the 
traditional methods of rational analysis; any different 
method of exposition was simply not acceptable. Especially 
the theatre.
Why then, would the existentialist persist, as he 
did? His task would have been simpler if he had acquiesced 
and agreed to explicate his philosophic issues in some more 
acceptable form. Perhaps, if he had, his efforts would now
be regarded with serious attention, instead o£ being regarded 
with a dismissive attitude: "It's not logic, it's just 
existentialism." Although not the sole reason for this 
attitude, the existentialist's refusal to limit his writings 
to one of the more usual philosophic forms has greatly 
contributed to this denigration.
Despite this, the existentialist continued his deep 
association with the literary arts. What quality or qualities 
did or does the artistic medium possess that makes it so 
attractive to the existentialist? Presumably, the 
existentialist reviewed other exposition forms to express 
his philosophic concepts, yet he elected to use various 
literary forms, in lieu of, or as a supplement to, his 
technical expositions. From this, it is reasonable to 
conclude that he deemed the literary form advantageous. What 
then are the differences between the specific literary forms 
used by the existentialist and some of the more analytic 
methods of current philosophy? If these differences allow the 
literary arts to better serve the existentialist than 
philosophic modes of exposition, then the literary arts have 
been justified as a means for expressing philosophic 
concepts, at least as far as the existential philosophies are 
concerned.
This unorthodox use of the theatre (i.e. as a means 
of philosophic expression), as well as the then perceived 
radical ideas of existentialism, contributed initially to the 
poor reception of the first existential plays in the
twentieth century. The established bourgeois theatre (as 
Jean-Paul Sartre would say) had developed a misunderstanding 
regarding the nature of existentialism, and unfortunately, 
there was also an unwillingness to change the shape and form 
of the paradigm play. However, these factors, as potent as 
they might have been, did not stop the existentialist's 
invasion of the theatre and the effect has been substantial.
The existentialist's contribution is more than a mere 
chapter in the history of theatre; these philosophies have 
left an indelible mark on contemporary theatre. Not only did 
the existential philosophies spawn 'the Theatre of the 
Absurd' movement, but they also established a new vocabulary, 
and a new set of theatrical terms and techniques for the 
stage. More noticeably, the existential element still 
thrives within the modern theatre, in content, form and 
attitude, as well as techniques. As far as the dramatists 
are concerned, the existentialist's decision to express and 
incorporate philosophy within a play, was good, albeit in the 
long run.
If the theatre can be demonstrated as a compatible 
and complimentary means for the expression of existentialism, 
then the existentialist must have made a correct decision. If 
this alternate means of expression does nothing other than 
enhance his philosophy, then to criticize him for doing so 
does not make sense, Twentieth century philosophy tends to 
emphasizt the value of clarity; existentialist philosophy 
also seeks clarity, but a clarity which includes human
psychology and/or lived experience. The existentialist 
claims that it is a mistake to remove the human element from 
logic; after all, we can only understand in human terms, 
since we are, in fact, human. By experimenting with literary 
forms, the existentialist concluded that the dramatic 
performance was one of the best, if not the best vehicle for 
his purpose. He wished to demonstrate and examine the 
historicity and the self-constituting nature of man, and the 
characters within a dramatic performance provide concrete 
exemplifications. This work, then, proposes to show the 
existentialist's decision to employ the several thousand year 
old medium of theatre, which is often perceived as a living 
and dynamic expression of human culture that both encompasses 
and transcends ethical and character paradigms, was correctly 
adduced.
In Part One, the dominant characteristics and purposes 
of the existential philosophies which differentiate it from 
other philosophies will be discussed. As the existential 
philosophies have an exceptionally broad range, no one 
particular existential philosophy will be used, but rather, a 
generic form of existentialism will be established. However, 
Jean-Paul Sartre will be frequently used as a reference, 
since he is closely associated with the union of 
existentialism and theatre.
In Part Two, it will be determined if the literary 
artistic form can satisfy the requirements of existential 
philosophic expression. That is, if the literary artistic
form is both adequate and advantageous for the expression of 
the existential philosophies, then any criticism rooted in 
such an argument is unjustified. If the literary artistic 
form (drama, in this instance) can satisfy the basic 
standards of philosophy, then, again, the decision to use it 
is valid. In this part, extensive use of the work of Martin 
Esslin (emeritus Professor of Drama at Stanford University, 
California) will be used to present an accurate description 
of the theatre, and also, of the existentialist's influence 
on theatre.
In Part Three, the main arguments against accepting 
the literary artistic form as a legitimate means of 
expression for the philosopher will be refuted. That is, the 
major concerns will be singled out, explained, and then, a 
counter argument will be presented. Finally, if all of this 
can be done adequately, then it will be established that the 
pejorative labelling of the existentialist as an 
artist/philosopher is unwarranted.
Part 1; Bxiatcntiallsm
If the existentialist is justified in selecting one 
or more of the literary arts as his vehicle of expression 
(without hindering its philosophic significance), then the 
following claims must be justified: first, that the 
existential philosophies, in general, have a content which is 
better expressed by literary artistic forms rather than the 
direct philosophical analytic forms; second, that the general 
goals or purposes of the existential philosophies are better 
achieved with these artistic forms than with their 
philosophical analysis counterparts.
If either of these claims cannot be demonstrated, 
then the existentialist's employment of artistic forms as a 
vehicle for philosophic expression has not been justified. 
That is, if the existential philosophies can be adequately 
expressed in analytic forms, then the decision to employ 
artistic forms is unnecessary and unfounded. If, however, 
there are some aspects of the existential philosophies that 
render artistic forms more suitable than analytic forms, then 
the existentialist's decision has been warranted.
There are at least two aspects which could warrant 
such a decision. One aspect is the issue of general content 
(within the existential philosophies); that is, if the topics 
of the existential philosophies cannot be adequately 
expressed in the philosophical analytic forms, then it is 
logical to seek an alternate form. This alternate form must
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also b# fhown to have tha capacity for tha adaquata 
axpraaaion which was lacking in tha traditional analytic 
forma. Tha other aapact concerna tha overall goala and/or 
purpoaaa of tha axlatantial philoaophiaa; that ia, if what 
tha axiatantialiata are trying to acoompliah ia more 
adequately aatiafiad within tha more flexible boundariaa of 
tha artiatic forma, than it aaama that their daoiaion haa 
bean warranted.
Before thaaa argumenta are developed, there are 
two pointa which need acme clarification: firat, a definition 
of the terma "artiatic forma" and "analytic forms" ia 
required and aecond, a brief note of the wide-apread uaage of 
existential themes and/or concepts within society will be 
helpful (this will be especially useful to ua later on).
Firstly, the term, "artiatic forma", will be 
referring to the various types within the liteeaty arts: 
novels, short stories, etc., or more pointedly, the focus of 
this thesis: drama/plays. The term, "philosophical analytic 
forma", or more simply, "analytic forma", will be referring 
to the various techniques of rational analysis: essays, 
texts, etc. Traditionally, philoaophy has chosen the latter 
for its vehicle of expression, yet, existentialism has made 
extensive use of the former.
Secondly, existentialism has become part of everyday 
language. Bxistentlalism is to philosophy what Freud was to 
psychology: a sudden explosion of radical thought, highly 
regarded, hotly disputed, then dismissed, and finally.
integrated into meinetreem culture. Every imaginable topic 
haa been examined from an exiatential angle; people have even 
been treated with exiatential paychoanalyala. Exiatentialiam 
ia in our novela, our comediea, our movie reviewa, and it haa 
alao changed the direction of the theatre.i It ia tempting to 
claim that no other philoaophy haa enjoyed auch familiarity, 
and later it will be claimed that thia familiarity ia, 
indeed, part of the purpoae of the exiatential philoaophiaa.
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A. The First Claim; Content
In this section, the content o£ the existential 
philosophies will be examined and then, some sort of common 
ground will be established. This will establish a gmneralis^d 
working definition. Once this task is accomplished, its 
expression in the artistic forms will be examined, and then 
jointly considered with the philosophical analytic forms, to 
determine if one form is preferable.
A class in existentialism will rarely attempt to 
define existentialism. But as Wittgenstein might have 
phrased it, each existential philosophy will have a family 
raaamblanca to another. This loose generalization will have 
to suffice. Sometimes, certain thinkers have been branded 
"existentialists" contrary to their own opinion.2 if this has 
been done, then there must be some sort of method for 
classification. However, if this ordinary language usage of 
the term existentialist is acceptable, then this entails that 
existentialism covers a wide basis, as the variation between 
the branded thinkers is diverse.
All existential philosophies will not share precisely 
the same mixture of characteristics; the most notable 
difference is the contrast between theistic existentialism, 
such as the philosophy associated with Martin Buber, and the 
atheistic existentialism, notably identified with the 
philosophy of Jean-Paul Bartre. Again, another distinction 
has been drawn between critical existentialism which
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•mphasisM an anti-traditional and/or anti-rationaliatic 
approach to philoaophy (associated with the works of Soren 
Kierkegaard), and soci»i existentialism which emphasises a 
contact with being and otherness (associated with the 
theistic works of Martin Buber).3
Such a broad range of application for the term 
existentisiism makes it challenging to establish a working 
definition (or rather, a set of classifying characteristics). 
Robert M. Martin (as extracted from The Philosopher’s 
Dietionsry) offers the following definition.
Existentialism - A school of philosophy developed largely 
in twentieth-century France and Germany, closely 
associated with SARTRE and HEIDEGGER. Although 
existentialists have had things to say about many areas 
of philosophy, they are best known for their views on 
FREEDOM 1. and RESPONSIBILITY. They tend to believe that 
we are totally free - that we are never caused to act by 
environment, heredity, or personality; and thus that we 
individually create all our decisions and values (the 
only source for ethical obligation) and are responsible 
for all our actions.*
This definition leaves much to be desired. There are two 
problematic areas: first, there is a factual problem (i.e. 
concerning some of the historical facts about the existential 
philosophies); second, the definition is somewhat lacking 
concerning the major tenets of the existential philosophies.
First, with regard to the facts, there is a problem 
concerning the origin of existentialism. Although the 
movement was not popularised until the twentieth century 
(with the works of Jean-Paul Sartre), it is generally 
regarded that existentialism began in the nineteenth century.
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with th# works of Sorsn Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche. 
It may be claimed that these two thinkers are forerunners of 
the existential movement. If Martin wishes to disclaim their 
contribution, then an argument should be offered. Since this 
is a definition and not an argument, this is not required; 
however, it seems only just that Kierkegaard should be 
mentioned since he has been dubbed the father of 
ejriateiitiaiis/n.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the definition 
ignores the focal point of the existential philosophies which 
is the human individual and his existence. That is, this 
philosophy explores the nature of the person himself. There 
is no reference made to this feature which is one of the 
crucial points within existentialism, and this same point 
also aids in distinguishing it from other philosophies. The 
definition does, however, capture what might be regarded as 
the popular ingredients of the existential movement: the 
concepts of freedom and responsibility. Mostly, then, this 
definition demonstrates the difficulty of establishing a 
definition.
If this term is examined from a purely logical 
perspective (i.e. semantically speaking), then 
existentialism is the philoaophy of axiatanea. That is, it is 
a philosophy which contemplates the issues and/or nature of 
being (the existent) and consequently, it is a branch of 
metaphysics. (When it was first introduced in North America, 
it was rather sarcastically referred to as mataphyaical
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pornography.^) The major tenet of existentialism may be 
expressed in these terms: existence precedes essence.# This 
tenet will be used as the basis from which a set of common 
characteristics of existential philosophies will be derived, 
and also, consequently, in the second claim, a general 
purpose of existentialism can be extracted largely from these 
characteristics.
Assuming this tenet as an acceptable starting point, 
the common characteristics of the existential philosophies 
can now be separated into two main categories; the logical 
implications of the individual's existence and, second, the 
way in which the individual addresses or handles these 
logical implications. (The second category represents the 
interest of this thesis.)
In the first category, the existentialist is making 
his logical and metaphysical claims; that is, he is making 
assertions about the nature of being. One of the most 
frequently cited claims ia: the individual defines himself.? 
That is, he creates his own essence (or we may want to use 
the term "personality"). The argument is as follows. First, 
it presupposes a sort of tnbula rasa; that is, human beings 
enter the world void of a preconceived personality. Second, 
human beings are self-determining. That is, they are in a 
continual state of becoming. With each situation individuals 
face, they make decisions (with awareness or otherwise) and 
thus, form an essence. At this point, it would be tempting to 
conclude that a human being is the sum of his acts. However,
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it will be demonstrated that this is not the case. It may be 
claimed that the essence represents the sum of his acts, but 
not that the individual is the sum of his acts. (The reason 
why will be clarified in the examination of existential 
freedom.)
Consequently, this claim leads to the popularized 
ideals within existentialism as previously cited by Robert M. 
Martin (of The Philosopheras Dietionsry)i freedom and 
responsibility. That is, the individual comes into existence 
(via an absurd accident if you subscribe to atheistic 
existentialism; via god if you prefer the theistic kind) and 
then is free to create himself; how he develops from that 
moment onward is his responsibility. As Sartre frequently 
states, men are condemned to be free: "Condemned, because he 
did not create himself, yet he is nevertheless, at liberty, 
and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is 
responsible for everything he does."* If the first claim is 
acceptable (that persons create their own essence), then 
this entails the concepts of individual freedom and 
responsibility. First, consider freedom. Sartre states, "The 
technical and philosophical concept of freedom, the only one 
which we are considering here, means only the autonomy of 
choice."# That is, freedom is not the ability to obtain one's 
wishes but rather, it is the ability to determine one's 
wishes. For example, I may wish to have a room in residence 
but this does not affect the reality of the situation; 
however, I can still wish this to be the case. Therefore, the
15
#woc*#a or fmilur# of an action ia not a oonaidaration within 
the concept of freedom, aa explained by Sartre.
The point that Sartre is establishing ia one of free 
will. That is, he is claiming that despite a traumatic 
childhood, the war, the depression, etc, when there is a 
situation of choice, the individual can always choose 
otherwise. Sartre poses these questions to clarify this 
point: "Shall I act by volition or by passion? Who can decide 
except me?"10 For example, a childhood trauma is not 
necessarily a causal explanation for an action: if Billy has 
been physically abused as a child, he is apt to use this as 
an excuse for his present abusive behavior. However, Sartre 
would argue that this is not a causal relation. That is, when 
the moment arrives and Billy must decide whether or not to 
beat his own children, he has the capacity to restrain his 
actions. Although deciding to do differently may be a 
difficult choice due to learned behavior and conditioning, 
nevertheless, Sartre claims it is possible: this possibility 
is all he needs to substantiate the notion of free will.
If human beings have unlimited free will, then Sartre 
is correct, and Billy cannot claim his traumatic experience 
as a causal agent for his present actions. That is, it is 
possible to imagine a man who was raised under similar 
circumstances, and yet as an adult he did not beat his 
children. Therefore, the connection, seemingly, is not 
necessarily causal. If, however, human beings are genetically 
unique (i.e. each human being is affected differently by
16
oircumatanoee), then it may be possible that certain life 
situations can condition the human brain so that a certain 
behavior becomes inevitable. If this is the case, then the 
connection may be necessarily causal. If this is the case, 
then human beings do not possess unlimited free will.
However, the concept of a limited free will was not a 
logical possibility for someone like Sartre. According to 
Sartre, freedom is, by definition, free. If freedom has 
limits, then it is no longer free but restrained. Likewise, 
the concept of a free will, consistent with the concept of 
freedom, can also have no limits. Therefore, the concept of 
a limited free will seemed to be a logical contradiction.
This seems to be a case of what we will call deception by 
lenguege. That is, due to certain linguistic implications, 
the concept of a limited free will appears to be a 
contradiction; however, in actuality, it is not a logical 
impossibility. Sartre over-estimated the capabilities of the 
human will: that is, freedom is a concept which can have 
degrees. The same follows for free will. Moreover, the 
concept of a limited free will has many practical and 
understandable aspects within society.
It seems more likely that some human beings are 
somewhat shaped, and therefore controlled, by their 
experiences. That is, their cognitive capacity for choice 
becomes limited.ii Sartre makes note of this as well,
Much more than he appears to make himself, man seems 
'to be made', by climate and the earth, race and class, 
language, the history of the collectivity of which he a
17
part, heredity, the individual ciroumatancea of hia 
childhood, acquired habits, the great and small events 
of his life.12
Even though he acknowledges this human tendency, Sartre 
persists that it is a tendency, not a limiting condition 
on the human cognitive capacity. Therefore, the person, 
despite all these factors, can still choose otherwise.13
This unlimited capacity for freedom, according to the 
existentialist, entails responsibility. This concept of 
responsibility has two senses: first, for the self, and 
second, for others. In the first sense, the concept of 
responsibility is referring to the individual's freedom to 
act and choose; that is, he is solely responsible for all 
that he does. Ultimately, he is the agent who made the 
decision; he cannot in good faith place responsibility 
elsewhere. Therefore, it is his responsibility. This sense 
of existential responsibility is clear-cut, but the second 
sense seems problematic.
Within the second sense, there is an attempt to 
establish ethical obligations. Sartre claims that the actions 
of the individual necessarily affect others, and this 
somehow binds us into including them in contemplating our 
decisions. This is due to what Sartre perceives a conformity 
phenomenon. That is, there a tendency amongst human beings to 
imitate behavior, at least to a degree which justifies 
generalisations. For example, a person opting to study 
business (which upon immediate reflection may only seem to
18
affect the pereon making that decision) may influence others 
to follow suit. Therefore, Sartre claims the individual ought 
to act as an exemplar.14
In conclusion then, the first category of existential 
characteristics has two features, one direct, and the other, 
indirect: first, the existential characteristics stem from 
the tenet that existence precedes essence, and second, the 
existentialial philosophies revolve around the existence of 
the individual. This second point is of the utmost importance 
to us: it reveals to us a distinguishing mark of the 
existential philosophies as compared with the other 
philosophies. That is, no other philosophy concentrates 
solely on the individual.
Within the existential philosophies, the individual 
has become the object of study; it can be claimed that the 
existentialist metaphorically pushes the concept of the human 
being as far as it can go. That is, what exactly is the 
capacity of the human mind? How much can a person think 
before he becomes mad? What is the limit? This indirectly 
discussed aspect of the existential philosophies will become 
more apparent within the second category of characteristics 
and also, within the second claim, concerning the goals or 
purposes. In Part 2 of this paper, it will be argued that 
these are the qualities which make the existential 
philosophies a perfect candidate for the artistic form.
Meanwhile, the summary continues. It was claimed that 
the (directly mentioned) major components of the first
19
category of existential characteristics consist of freedom 
and responsibility; the former concept has some problematic 
areas which would also affect the role of responsibility.
That is, if freedom has limits, then responsibility will also 
have limits. Nonetheless, this first category consists of the 
realization of what being is: a self-determining object as 
opposed to a pre-determined object. This realization will 
be entitled the existential revelation.
This introduces the second category of existential 
characteristics: how the individual handles the logical 
implications of his being. This resembles a practical 
examination, or an educated observation, of how the 
individual handles the first category or the existentiel 
revelation. According to the existentialist, the individual 
typically addresses this revelation in the following manner: 
with dread and/or anguish, and with avoidance.
Before these aspects are examined, the problem of 
negativity or pessimism will be addressed. That is, the 
existentialist is accused of being a "negative" thinker 
wallowing in a pit of despair. Such an accusation undermines 
the philosophy; the use of the word "negative'*, in this 
instance, is pejorative. Therefore, the evaluation of the 
philosophy of the is affected by such comments, which do not 
accurately describe the state of affairs as presented by the 
existentialists.
The problem is a misinterpretation of what the 
existentialist reports regarding this second category of
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oh#r#ot*ri#tic#. That ia, the existential revelation produces 
a stereotypical negative state of affair: persons filled with 
dread and anxiety and/or persons who live in a state of 
denial. The existentialist does not, however, claim that 
this should be the case or that it must continue to be the 
case.
In Existentialiam and Humanism, Sartre claims that 
existentialism cannot properly be considered "negative" in 
this instance. In defense of existentialism, he provides the 
following argument. The existential philosophies claim that 
the individual possesses unlimited freedom. Basically, this 
means that the individual is endowed with the cognitive 
capacity to create his own meaning of life. The individual 
is in control of his own life, and all he must do is decide. 
If this is the case, then the existential philosophies serve 
as an empowering force for the individual; that is, he is the 
master of his own fate.is Therefore, the existential 
philosophies are not negative per se (i.e. in and of 
themselves); rather, it is the individuals who, due to the 
previously mentioned affects, either refuse to accept or 
cannot handle the impact of the existential revelation.i*
Consequently, most individuals lead lives which are 
iiisuthentic. First, the anguish and/or dread response to the 
existential revelation will be discussed. These terms may be 
considered separately or jointly; they refer to separate 
ideas, but together, they explain the overwhelming effect of 
the existential revelation. Sartre offers the following
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definition of mnguimh;
Anguish ia natural to man. It maana this: the man 
who involves himself and who realizes that he 
is not only the person he chooses to be, but 
also a lawgiver who is, at the same time, making 
a choice for all mankind as well as for himself, 
cannot therefore escape the feeling of his deep 
and total responsibility.!*
This definition gives an insight into the magnitude of the 
existential revelation; that is, as an individual fully 
realizes his responsibility for making decisions and/or the 
effects of these actions, trivial or significant, he enters a 
state of anguish. Sometimes, this state of anguish can be 
heightened to the point of a psychological disorder, and as 
such, a method of existential therapy was established to 
address these occurrences. Mitchell Bedford describes the 
problem in this way: "An existential neurosis may be 
classified as the individual's inability to see meaning in 
life as he abides in the inauthentic existential modality."!? 
Therefore, the existential revelation has the capacity to 
overwhelm an individual.
The second way of addressing with the existential 
revelation is with avoidance. This can result in two ways: 
first, if the existential revelation is too overwhelming for 
the individual, and second, if an individual already exists 
in a state of avoidance. In either scenario, the individual 
develops an attitude of bêd £êith; that is, the individual 
attempts to escape the responsibility of freedom via a method 
which places this onus elsewhere (e.g. religion often implies
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that God has a plan for paraons and therefore persona can 
claim certain things are beyond their control).
According to the existentialist, most individuals 
devise these methods of self-deception to compensate for the 
overwhelming responsibility of possessing freedom, or more 
pointedly, to make living possible. That is, if the 
existential revelation is accepted, then decision-making 
becomes a crucially important activity. Persons may become 
choice-constipated; that is, unable to make decisions. This 
results in an overall lack of actualisation of personal 
potential. (This will be connected as part of the second 
claim: the goals or purposes of existentialism.) According 
to the existentialist, a person realises his freedom, gains 
the insight of responsibility for this freedom, and then, 
inevitably shies away from it.
For example, let us consider Sartre's The fiies. In 
this play, two characters, Orestes and Blectra, are 
confronted with the responsibility of freedom: they have 
willfully murdered their parents, and now, they must cope 
with their action. How do they respond? Orestes accepts the 
action as his own; he deliberated upon the situation, he made 
his decision and then he acted upon it. He is authentic 
whereas Blectra cannot accept her decision which resulted in 
the murder of her parents. Instead of accepting her action, 
she opts to return to a state of denial; that is, she 
believes it was her fsfe to commit murder and therefore, it 
was net truly her decision, but the plan of the gods. Orestes
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represent# the existential ideal whereas Ileotra represents 
the norm. By presenting these themes in a dramatic mode, 
Sartre creates a situation that may be understood by any 
audience member who can relate to the emotions of either 
character.
At this point, the term, which seems to be an 
oxymoron, can be introduced: the existential hero. If 
existentialism is perceived as a negative school of thought, 
then this term will not make sense. That is, this term will 
signify a person who exemplifies despair and anguish and this 
conflicts with the idea of a hero. However, if the empowering 
force concept is accepted as the content of existentialism, 
then the term has meaning. That is, the term then refers to a 
person who has accepted his responsibility of freedom and has 
therefore, actualized his potential.
In conclusion then, the content of existentialism can 
be summarized as follows: an emphasis on the person and/or 
his development; an emphasis on the concepts of freedom and 
responsibility; and an examination of how persons do and 
should handle the previous two points. Now that the content 
has been established, is it better suited for the artistic 
form or the analytic form?
In Part 2, it will be claimed that the tenets of the 
existential philosophies can be more accurately expressed in 
the artistic form. That is, the existentialists stress the 
individual in situation: how will the individual act? What 
will he decide to do? What can he decide to do? To what can
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h# appeal aa a aouroa o£ knowledge? X£ there la no objective 
aouroe of meaning to which the individual can refer, then he 
haa only himself to answer these questions. This profoundly 
relates to the literary artistic forma, in particular, to the 
drama.
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B. The Second Claim: Purpoae
The second claim concerns the goals or purposes of 
the existential philosophies. That is, this is a matter of 
what the existentialists were hoping to accomplish with 
their philosophies. Roughly, this is the claim: the purpose 
of the existential philosophies is substantially different 
from traditional philosophies and this difference contributes 
to the overall decision to choose an alternate means of 
expression. The purpose of the existential philosophies must 
be shown to satisfy the following: first, that it is 
significantly different from traditional philosophies, and 
second, that this difference warrants the use of an alternate 
vehicle of expression.
As mentioned in the discussion of the first claim 
(regarding content), this issue can largely be derived from 
what we entitled the second category of characteristics. It 
could be stated that existentialism poses a revelation 
regarding the nature of human existence, then adds a 
commentary claiming most individuals are not psychologically 
capable of fully accepting such a revelation. Prom this, a 
conclusion can be drawn about what the existentialist aimed 
to accomplish with this information. That is, did he want to 
actively rectify the situation? What is the existentialist 
concerned with? Mitchell Bedford claims, "The existential 
concern is to drive man back to his more basic inner 
problems- what it means to be a self, how man ought to use
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his (r#*dom, how man can find and keap the courage to face 
death,"!# Therefore, the purpose of existentialism is to 
enlighten the individual regarding his own being, and then, 
to aid him in achieving a greater sense of freedom and 
responsibility.
The purpose, then, of the existential philosophies 
can be divided into two aspects: first, to solve the issues 
surrounding the existential revelation, and second, to apply 
this solution in concrete. That is, the existential 
philosophies represent a form of applied philosophy; they 
do not merely pose a theoretical problem and solution, but 
rather, they pose a question and also a solution in practice. 
Moreover, understanding existentialism also largely comes 
from examining one's life as it is lived. The "in concrete" 
aspect of existentialism is a necessary part of communicating 
the philosophy.
This purpose differentiates the existential 
philosophies from other traditional philosophies. That is, 
other philosophies tend to remain in what may be deemed 
academia, Philosophy is intended for other philosophers or 
scholars as a form of theoretical knowledge; its range of 
application is somewhat limited.
Regarding the first aspect, the existential goal is 
for persons to discover their primordial and/or inner 
problems; what it means to be a self, and then, to properly 
use this knowledge to better themselves and their life 
conditions. If a person possesses the freedom of
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r*#pon#ibility, then he can use thia to his benefit; he can 
manipulate hie eooio-environment as he sees fit. Therefore, 
persons have the ability to actively determine the infra­
structure of human society. As Sartre claims, existentialism 
can be an empowering force.
With regard to the second aspect, Sartre notes the 
connection between practice and theory: "But if existence 
really does precede essence, man is responsible for what he 
is. Thus, existentialism's first move is to make every man 
aware of what he is and to make the full responsibility of 
his existence on him."i* (Later, this purpose will be 
connected with the selection of an alternate vehicle of 
expression.) The existentialist, then, is concerned with the 
conveyance of his message. Therefore, the onus placed on the 
existentialist differs from the one placed on other 
philosophers.
If he is to be consistent with his theory, then he 
must apply it. His vehicle of expression should be equipped 
to handle this decision. That is, the vehicle of expression 
must be one that appeals to a great range of persons. The 
existentialist must then ask himself: which vehicle of 
expression has the greatest audience?
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C. Conclusion
Of these two categories - the logical implications of 
being, and the consequences of these logical implications - 
it is the latter which is presented in the literary arts. The 
latter category has practical value inasmuch as it speculates 
about possible motivation (or laofc of) for human behavior.
The first category claims that we are free while the second 
category asks, what will we do about this?
The distinction between these two categories is also 
significant: it serves as a determining agent with regard to 
the vehicle of expression. That is, if the existentialist is 
exploring an issue in the first category, then he is apt to 
employ an analytic form, whereas if he is exploring an issue 
within the second category, he is apt to employ an artistic 
form. The distinction can be viewed as one between practice 
and theory, whereby the first category represents theory and 
the second category represents practice.
Thus, the existentialist presents his case and then 
embarks on a process of actualization. To highlight this 
point, we can refer to Sartre: he believed philosophy was 
only useful if it resulted in practice. Therefore, he applied 
his philosophy. His original expectation for a person's 
capacity to accept responsibility was high; he had been 
convinced that most individuals could, in fact, attain a high 
degree of freedom, or lead authentic lives. It was only later 
in his writings that he decided his expectations had been too
2»
high, and the number who attain and accept their freedom ia 
email; he even poetulated that the individual who doe# manage 
to break the chains of hia inauthenticity only does ao for a 
fleeting moment. It aeema that authenticity requires 
continual maintenance and effort, it ia not something to be 
taken for granted.
It can be argued that the duty of the existentialist 
is to elaborate upon these ideals and also, to increase and 
to better the degree of freedom and responsibility (of that 
freedom) attained by individuals. An economical way of 
achieving this is through the arts.
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Part 2: Tha Artistic Forms
Mow that the general content and purpose of the 
existential philosophies have been established, it can be 
determined if this is compatible with one or more artistic 
forms. That is, can an artistic form accurately satisfy 
these aspects? If the use of an artistic form is acceptable 
as a means of philosophic expression (without altering its 
own nature), then the following arguments must be 
demonstrated: first, that the features of the particular 
artistic form are not only suitable for expressing 
existential features but also, are not neglected because of 
the union (i.e. of literature and existentialism); second, 
that the artistic form must have the capacity to properly 
articulate knowledge, and third, the artistic form must also 
satisfy the existential philosophies in some way that the 
expository philosophical analytic form cannot, Therefore, if 
the artistic form cannot be shown to have these capacities, 
then it cannot be considered a proper means of philosophic 
expression for the existential philosophies.
Consider the first argument: the issue of mutual 
compatibility. The union of a particular artistic form and 
existentialism must be compatible on both sides; that is, the 
union must not be an impediment to either form. If, in order 
for the artistic form to express existential features, it is 
necessary that certain features of its own are neglected, 
then the union has been not successful. If the union is not
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successful end results in the neglect of certain features of 
the artistic form, then it will be argued that the artistic 
form is not appropriate for existentialists. For example, if 
the end product is a bad novel, then existentialism has not 
made proper use of that artistic form. Therefore, the 
standard for judging existentialism and the standard for 
judging artistic form must both be satisfied for the union to 
be deemed successful. This does not entail that the 
existentialists cannot, to any degree, modify the artistic 
form, but only that this modification must ultimately satisfy 
both sets of standards. (It is important to note that there 
are many styles of a particular genre [e.g. a novel can be 
naturalistic, romantic, etc.] but each type will still adhere 
to a general, basic standard.)
Consider the second argument: the capacity for 
knowledge. This is an important aspect within philosophy as 
an academic pursuit. That is, philosophy is concerned with 
the advancement and/or improvement of knowledge. If the 
artistic form can not properly articulate knowledge (of some 
kind), then it cannot be a useful means for the existential 
philosophies.
Consider the third argument : the capacity to give a 
better presentation, or to offer some feature that the 
analytic form cannot. If the artistic form does not enhance 
the presentation of the existential philosophies, then its 
usage is pointless. That is, if the artistic form can offer 
nothing but what the analytic form offers, then there is no
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legitimate reason to change from one form to enother, and, 
consequently, the existentialist would not be justified.
These three arguments will be examined in accordance 
with the form of drama. It will be argued that the drama is 
one of the better forms for the existentialist, and, as a 
point of demonstration, this will be compared to another 
frequently used form, the novel.
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A. Novel and/or Drama
The supreme forbearance of the Catholic may irritate us, 
because it is an acquired thing. If he is a novelist, it 
is a great advantage.i
Jean-Paul Sartre, Lit. and Phil. Essays
The claim is that the drama is a better means of 
expression for the existentialist than is the novel. It 
should be noted that this does not mean that the novel is 
inadequate for the existentialist, only that for a variety of 
reasons, the drama is better suited to the existentialist. 
This argument will be presented within the context of 
compatibility: it will be argued that the nature of the 
drama, as opposed to the nmture of the novel, gives the drama 
an edge that the novel simply cannot duplicate.
To support our argument, then, the novel, as a 
artistic form, must demonstrate the following two aspects: 
first, that its general features are mutually compatible with 
those of the existentialist; and second, that this 
compatibility is of a lesser degree when compared to the form 
of the drama.
To determine if this is the case, a working 
definition of the term novei and/or a general standard for 
its judgment must be established. In order to determine the 
degree of compatibility that each form has with the 
existential features, what defines that form must be clearly 
known. This will also aid in determining if either of these 
forms is sacrificing its standard to accommodate the
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feature#.
First, what is a novel? The FunAr 6 Uagnttlls Standard 
D0êk Dictionary offer# the following definition: "A fictional 
prose narrative of considerable length, usu. having an 
overall pattern or plot."2 Although this definition may serve 
to identify a novel in ganoral, it is not satisfactory for 
our purposes; first, it is too vague; and second, it lacks 
any details which may provide a standard for judgment.
According to John Hospers, literature is the least 
aesthetic of the creative art forms. He bases this on four 
factors: first, it has less potential for structural 
complexities; second, these potentialities are limited; 
third, it has no auditory or visual sensualities; and fourth, 
despite these poverties, it must attempt to present them or 
it will be deemed as lacking.* At this point, the general 
definition can be combined with the specifics provided by 
Hospers. Zn layman's terms then, the novel has four, albeit 
malleable, characteristics: setting, character, plot and
theme, all of which take place in print» For example, the 
amell of ros^e may be referred to in print, but the sensation 
is not actually present, whereas, in contrast, it could be 
present in a dramatic production.
In regard to the first argument, is the novel 
compatible with the existential features? That is, to what 
extent can the definition of a novel incorporate the 
existential features: first, the logical implications of the 
"existence precedes essence" tenet, and second, how the
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individual addressas thaaa implications, or what was loossly 
termed the existential revelation. The novel can incorporate 
these features only inasmuch as the printed word will allow; 
however, the drama can offer a physical illustration. The 
drama is not necessarily dependent on language to convey its 
purpose (it has a variety of means for oommunieating ideas) 
whereas the novel remains solely dependent on language. As 
the existentialists find fault with language, the novel's 
dependence on it may be an impediment to some of the 
existential philosophies, or at least, some of their 
arguments,
In regard to the second argument, how does this 
compare to the drama? The drama has a greater range of 
abilities concerning all of its characteristics. That is, the 
drama has the same qualities that the novel has, but it also 
has an additional quality: it is three-dimensional, it has 
spatio-temporal qualities. The novel must present itself 
in written word alone, whereas the drama has physical 
activity. In the drama, the audience member is left to 
interpret the stage activity by himself (sans written 
direction), whereas in a novel, this type of interpretation 
is greatly decreased; the words describe the intended 
Interpretation. In drama, as in existentialism, the onus is 
on the individual. This additive quality is best illustrated 
in the argument of compatibility.
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B. Compatibility
Tho artiat make# art not to save humankind but to aave 
himaelf.
Camille Paglia, Sexuml Pereonae
In this section, it will be demonstrated that the 
drama, as a form, has these two characteristics: first, that 
its general features are mutually compatible with those of 
the existentialist's; second, that the degree of 
compatibility is greater than that of the novel. To do this, 
a general definition of drama must first be established.
Unlike other art forms, drama synthesises several 
artistic styles enabling it to affect all human senses 
simultaneously. Whereas literature is said to be the iessfc 
aesthetic of art forms, drama is considered the most 
aesthetic.4 Although this diversity impedes the search for 
an adequate definition, ultimately it will prove to be 
advantageous for the existentialist, (The diverse nature of 
this form implies that the incorporation of a new idea may be 
easier.) Because drama is so diversely encompassing, listing 
specific, defining features is difficult; seemingly, there 
will always be one type of drama that will remain anomalous.
Therefore, in determining an adequate definition and/ 
or general standard for drama, two clarifying points will be 
made: first, the focus will be on the classical drama and/or 
its mainstream counterpart (this type of drama represents the 
boutgéoiâ drama [that Bartre despised] that the 
existentialist eventually challenged); and second, a simpler
3#
definition, or porhnp#, tho oJIroioton of dromo, will bo 
positod.
It ohottld bo noted thot tho word moinatremm ia being 
used to refer to popular and/or oommeroial drama (from a 
practical perspective; the shows that will generate profit). 
Vera Gottlieb notes how the theatre is in a desperate 
situation regarding financial concerns; that is, money often 
figures prominently (more than, perhaps it should) in 
determining which shows are produced.# However, the 
mainstream drama does not represent any specific genre 
rather, it only refers to the formulaic manner of production 
(e.g. a director may add a certain level of song and dance to 
create additional appeal, he may add a political flavor, or 
he may alter an ending/resolution to make it more presentable 
to his particular audience). For example, Cata, Death of s 
Dsiesmsn, or any Gilbert and Sullivan production: mainstream 
drama is largely the manner of production, and as the list of 
examples reveal, there is a fairly wide range of genre (Cata 
is a musical/dance largely drawn from the works of T.S.
Eliot, Death of a Salaaman is an Arthur Miller play, while 
the works of Gilbert and Sullivan are usually spectacles). 
These plays are usually performed with lavish sets and 
costumes with special effects to awe and amase the audience. 
This kind of dramatic presentation is also what Sartre 
labelled: bourgeois.
If this distinction between mainstream drama and 
existential drama is acceptable, then another problem raised
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by th« d#oi#ion to employ an alternat# form
of expreaaion can be noted. The exlatentialiat waa perceived 
aa damaging the norm of drama: first, the exiatentialiat 
content waa not immediately acceptable; and aecond, the atyle 
that permeated exiatential drama waa alao not immediately 
acceptable. Exiatential drama waa, after all, highly 
experimental, However, both of theae concerna will be 
diamiaaed on the baaia of the following: firatly, they are 
pragmatic (and therefore, not affecting our philosophic 
pursuit), and secondly, they reflect a spontaneous judgment 
(which waa ultimately shown to be erroneous).
Firstly then, the classical drama will be examined; 
its origin can be directly traced to the Ancient Greek 
culture, in particular, to the writings of Aristotle. He 
identified six features which he claimed were necessarily 
part of a good drama: lexis (language), opsia (spectacle), 
melos (music), mythes (plot), ethe (character), and dianoia 
(thought and/or intellect).* Although these six features are 
still part of the drama today, they are not necessarily 
portrayed in the same manner as Aristotle recommended.
According to Aristotle, the good drama will possess a 
sense of unity in each of these features. Since he placed a 
great emphasis on plot (he refers to it as the **soui" of the 
drama), we will select this feature aa a representative of 
Aristotle's unity. He claims.
Now, a whole ia that which has a beginning, a middle, 
and an end. A beginning is that which does not 
necessarily follow something else, but after which
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somathing «Isa naturally la or follows. An and ia tha 
oppoaita; it naturally follows aomathing alaa, aithar 
naoaaaarily or for tha moat part, and haa nothing 
aftar it. A middla both follows aomathing alaa and haa 
aomathing alaa following it. Wall-compoaad plots, 
tharafora should not start or and just anywhara, but 
should axhibit tha faaturaa just mantionad.?
With thia in mind, Ariatotla allowad for a drama that waa 
baaed on a parson's lifa to hava omissions; that ia, ha did 
not objaot to an aapaot of a parson's lifa baing omittad if 
it oould not fit ooharantly into tha plot. Thia unifiad plot 
haa two important oonaaquancaa: first, tha conflict within 
tha drama must ba adaquataly raaolvad by its and; and aacond, 
tha artiat ia now chargad with presenting tha ethically 
correct lifa.
Firstly, tha conflict which ia presented must hava an 
adequate resolution. Each aspect of tha Aristotelian play 
was to ba unifiad; each had to ultimately reflect a sense 
of order or purpose. For example, at tha "and" of his plot, 
Aristotle raoommandad a aatharaia or purging; that ia, an 
edifying removal of tha trauma, or in a more spiritual sense, 
a cleansing of tha soul. This type of ending and plot than 
served aa an ethical agent: by tha play's and, the problem 
waa solved and goodness waa restored. First, the artiat ia 
responsible to display what could be tha case, aa opposed to 
what ia the case. Therefore, tha artist is presenting the 
type of life that persons should strive to attain: one of 
order and resolution.# Also, from a practical perspective, 
the catharsis served as an outlet for emotional release which 
helped maintain a sense of temperance, a virtue highly valued
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by Aristotl*.
Aristotle even furthered his demands on the drama by 
giving it an ethical duty; the play has certain structural 
requirements which present life as it should be: filled with 
resolution. (According to Aristotle, the artist is presenting 
how life ought to be.) However, the mainstream counterpart 
has somewhat modified these features. Like the classical 
drama, it exhibits an organized manner of life and living. 
Prom its framework to its very content, it displays an 
orderly system aimed at helping the audience achieve an 
understanding. It was claimed that the proper purpose of a 
drama was the ability to leave the audience with a pleasant 
feeling, a full understanding and a deeper appreciation.*
The content of the drama must follow a gradual climb 
in plot which eventually culminates in a climax and is then 
resolved in a conclusion or denouement. Likewise, the 
framework also represents order. That is, each element 
mentioned in the contont, has a recommended positional place 
within the overall framework. The emphasis is on a structure 
which offers and maintains uadorêtondingi it (the play) must 
be understood.
To exemplify this emphasis, the use of language 
within the mainstream drama will be examined. The dramatic 
script is unique: it has a two-fold nature, primary and 
secondary text.i* Primary text refers to the dialogue or that 
part of the drama that the audience will hear. Secondary text 
refers to that part of the script that the audience will not
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hear, such as stage directions (e.g. Exit stage ieft). If a 
person is reading a drama, he will be reading both levels of 
text, and often the effect is lost. A drama is meant to be 
performed, not read. Martin Esslin claims, "Theatre is more 
than mere language. Language alone can be read, but true 
theatre can become manifest only in performance."ii A drama 
refers to the thing done.
Mainstream theatre emphasizes primary text, and also 
this primary text must provide any necessary details that 
will aid the audience in its overall understanding of the 
drama.
Often, within mainstream drama, the secondary text 
may be ignored or modified. For example, if the author 
includes a description of the set, then the director may or 
may not follow these instructions. Language, as used within 
mainstream theatre, must accomplish the following: it must 
furtively reveal exposition (without stilting the dialogue); 
it must provide information regarding the accumulating plot; 
and lastly, this must be accomplished intelligibly and 
coherently placed within the structure of the drama. 
Therefore, language is a tool for communicating the story 
effectively.
Since all of these qualifications place many 
limitations upon the drama, the author must now present only 
those ideas and situations that he can skillfully reveal 
within this framework, and also, that can be adequately 
resolved by the drama's end. If art mirrors reality, then
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reality, according to this method of drama, is organised and 
can be understood.
Following from this, the existential features are not 
compatible. That is, the existentialist does not support the 
idea that reality can necessarily be understood. Since the 
existentialist claims that existence precedes essence, then 
he cannot place persons in a situation that will resolve 
itself by the drama's end, if he wants to remain logically 
consistent. That is, for the existentialist, the individual 
creates his own essence and establishes his own meaning in 
life. Therefore, to comply with such an organised 
perspective of reality, the existentialist would be 
contradicting his own movement.
Seemingly then, the existentialist features are not 
mutually compatible with the general features of the drama. 
However, as claimed earlier, this is largely a superficial 
incompatibility; that is, the difference lies with the 
interpretation of a drama. As we noted earlier, there is 
a skeleton of drama necessarily underlying all drama, and 
this can be fleshed out in a variety of acceptable ways. We 
will now demonstrate two things: first, that the 
existentialist features comply with this skeleton; and, 
second, that the existentialist's features comply with an 
important aspect of Aristotle's explication (language and 
plot).
In his explications regarding the structure and 
form of the drama, Martin Isslin claims that a definition for
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the modern drama ie not normative in any strict sense, but 
has fluid boundaries.12 This is reflected in its application: 
as a term, "drsms" is employed to describe street mimes, 
stage productions, and professional ballets. Basically, the 
modern drama will satisfy the following criteria: first, 
action and/or movement; second, an audience; third, spatial 
and time dimensions; and fourth, a written text (this is 
considered optional).!3
If the existential drama satisfies these criteria, 
then the union is mutually compatible. The existentialist 
drama has movement and/or action; that is, there are 
characters presented who do move. Hopefully, there will be 
an audience, at least, it has the capability of having an 
audience. Since it is live theatre, it dees possess spatial 
and temporal qualities. Lastly, it has a written script 
(which also complies with the optional factor).
First, the use of language within the existentialist 
drama will be examined (offered as a comparison with the use 
of language within mainstream drama), and consequently, this 
will introduce us to the issue of compatibility with 
Aristotle's explication of the essential features of the 
drama. Language will be employed as an example to indicate 
the differences and then, ultimately, these differences will 
be revealed as superficial.
It should be noted that a distinction was made 
originally between existential drama and the Theatre of the 
Absurd. Although these two are now considered to be within
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th« mmme category, originally, there had been a distinction. 
As a starting point, the difference is a simple 
clarification: ffjristeiitiai plays were written by philosophers 
whereas the Abaurd plays were written by playwrights.
However, the distinction did have a basis: initially, the 
existentialists followed the examples set by the mainstream 
theatre, and second, the absurdists did not.
Martin Esslin claims that, "In some senses the 
theatre of Sartre and Camus is less adequate as an expression 
of the philosophy of Sartre and Camus - in an artistic, as 
distinct from philosophic, terms - than the Theatre of the 
Absurd."14 That is, the structure of the existentialist 
plays was too well-organized to give an accurate portrayal of 
the "ejristentiai " human condition. For example, consider a 
comparison of bare plots. First, we will present Sartre's 
play, *'Diity Hands**’, the play is about war; the plot focuses 
around the character Hugo who has been contracted to 
assassinate the leader of an opposing party.is Now, consider 
Eugene Ionesco's play, "Rhinoceros*’’, a township of people are 
transforming into rhinoceroses, until the main character, 
Berenger is left alone.i* Esslin is claiming that the 
existentialists portray characters, themes, and even plots 
that are too coherently laid out and intricate to signify the 
actual absurdity (i.e. lack of meaning) that these 
philosophers are claiming.
To continue then, the analysis will now be expanded, 
through examples of language usage in the contemporary
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theatre scene, If a drama is intended for performance, 
rather than for a reading, a script may be an afterthought. 
Consider Canadian playwright, Daniel Mclvor. In his play 
House (a man in group therapy), he explored the emotional 
development of a middle-aged man accepting his past mistakes 
and now, the present condition of his life. With regard to 
writing the actual play, Mclvor states.
When House won a Chalmers Canadian Play award earlier 
this year I was surprised because House, I felt, was a 
performance, the only 'script* for the piece was a 
transcript I had taken from the last performance; it did 
not exist for me on paper at that time.i?
Despite the fact that the script was secondary, the drama was 
still able to communicate its meaning. Primary text is not 
necessarily used as an expositional device for the 
existential drama.
Language, within the existential drama, is a tool 
unto itself. That is, the emphasis is on how language is 
used, as opposed to what is said. To demonstrate with an 
extreme example, Samuel Beckett's play, "Act Hithout Hotds I" 
has no language.1* This simply could not be done in 
mainstream drama: it requires language as a means to 
communicate its story. Therefore, for this type of drama, 
language does not possess the onus of communication that it 
does in mainstream drama.
With regard to the second point, although the 
existential features are not compatible with the mainstream 
drama, they are, however, compatible with an important
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feature of Arietotle'a explication. Consider the following 
passage from Aristotle's Poûtica:
It must be things as they actually were or are, things as 
people say and think that they are, or things as they 
ought to be. These things are all expressed either by 
familiar diction or with the addition of metaphors; there 
are many modifications of ordinary diction that we 
allow to the poets.19
Firstly, then, Aristotle acknowledges that the artist may 
transgress from the standard use of language to achieve his 
purpose. To further reiterate the liberty an artist may take 
to achieve his means, Aristotle also claims.
If what has been written is impossible, then an error has 
been committed. But it is all right if the art achieves 
its own end (we have already seen what the end is) and if 
in this way that part itself is made more striking.20
This is compatible with the existentialist's features; that 
is, the existentialist has in mind a "goal" and is employing 
unusual yet appropriate means to achieve it. Therefore, it 
seems that Aristotle's passage would have to grant that the 
existentialist is at liberty to experiment with language in 
order to "achieve his end".
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C. Capacity for Knowledge
A good story Is like a bitter pill with the sugar coating 
inside of it.
O'Henry
Now then, it is time for the second argument. If one 
or more of the artistic forms is acceptable for philosophic 
purposes, then it must have the capacity to properly present 
knowledge. That is, we are presuming that philosophy is a 
knowledge-based discipline. Therefore, the artistic form 
must be a proper vehicle reflecting this interest.
Mario J. Valdes claims that truth-olaims are 
possible within literary artistic forms due to the following 
factors: first, an appeal to external references; second, a 
resemblance to life-likeness; third, the possibility of 
historical understanding; fourth, textual authority or the 
author's background; and fifth, the possibility of shared 
experiences.21 Valdes claims that these factors substantiate 
the truth-olaims within literary artistic forms as 
legitimate; that is, they can be verified, falsified, or 
considered inconclusive if there is not enough evidence to 
reach a conclusion.
The first two factors, he claims, are verifiable in 
a sort of "empirical" sense. He states,
A textual statement with empirical referents becomes an 
empirical truth-olaim when it is part of a purported 
empirical relationship inside the text and this 
relationship is accepted by the reader as not being in 
conflict with any of his or her unyielding precepts of
reality.22
so
That ia, the referents within the confines of the text must 
behave in a similar manner to their real counterparts, and 
this behavior must be constant throughout the text. For 
example, the characters must obey the law of gravity just as 
their real counterparts do. The second factor can be 
"tested” in a similar manner; that is, the behavior of 
characters and their situations must be recognizable. This 
claim also refers to semantic coherence. That is, the 
language used within the text must be used according to 
regular standards. His claim is: if language is not being 
employed according to standard usage, then it cannot be 
readily understood. Consequently, Valdes claims the text must 
obey the regular standards of language. (As a side note, he 
claims this does not affect the use of metaphors as they are 
also a part of standard language use.)
The other three factors do not have an immediate 
sense of verifiability in the sense that the first two claims 
do. The textual authority claim is somewhat related to these 
claims; that is, it refers to the author's ability to create 
a sense of reliability within the text: the author must avoid 
discrepancies. For example, if an author states that a 
character has acute arthritis in his hands in chapter two, 
but in chapter eight, this character is a professional 
pianist, then his reliability factor is diminished. That is, 
he has failed to provide an accurate description within the 
context of the piece of fiction.
An historical understanding reveals an insight to a
51
particular ara; thla can rafar to tha parapactivaa of tha 
author hlmaalf (if tha author ia from anothar ara), tha 
narrativa voica or atory (if thara ia a raconatruction of 
paat avanta) or if tha piaoa ia a documentary, Ovarall, thia 
claim ia: a litarary piaca raflacta tha foaling and attituda 
of tha ara in which it was written. Thia ia viawad aa a fact 
ragardlaaa of whether or not it waa tha artiat'a intention, 
or ita rating by any atandard. For example, aome critica 
claim that Henrik Xbaen waa not an intentional feminiat; they 
contend that theae ara modern intarpretationa, and not a 
reflection of hia own beliefa, yet a number of hia playa, 
auch aa iYacfda Oabler and A Doll*a Houaa, advocate themea of 
faminiam or rather, the need for feminiam.
Ultimately, Valdea deacribea a truth-claim aa an 
agreement. He olaima, ". . a relationahip between the
text and the reader. . . The truth-olaim exiata when the 
reader ia confronted with a atatement that he or ahe is aaked 
to accept in order to go on reading.*'2 3 Therefore, the 
reader ia an active participant in determining the truth- 
olaima; that ia, he ia called upon to make a judgment.
Therefore, it has been eatabliahed that the artiatio 
form haa the capacity to properly preaent knowledge; it 
convoya a conceptual for of knowledge. It can provide 
inaighta and ideaa. It may hava been noticed that aome of 
the olaima are not immediately applicable to existential 
fiction. That ia, Valdea more accurately deacribea fiction of 
the realism genre; that ia, he la aubaoribing to the idea of
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r#pr##«nt#tionml art: fiction muat accurately dopiet reality. 
Seemingly, thia does not readily apply to a number of 
existential pieces. However, this is a groundwork: it has 
been shown that fiction has the capacity to yield knowledge.
Now then, how does this relate to existential 
fiction? The claims that seem contradictory with existential 
fiction will be refuted. Chiefly then, these claims are the 
representational requirement and also the requirement for 
semantic coherence. Both of these claims can be refuted with 
the same argument: existential fiction does satisfy these 
requirements, and two examples will be employed to illustrate 
this point.
To demonstrate the problem with representationalism, 
Eugene Ionesco's play, "ffow to Clot Rid of ft.'** will be 
used. Firstly, this play appears to contradict these claims; 
seemingly, it has little connection to everyday reality as we 
know it. For example, this is the bare plot: for years, a 
middle-aged couple have existed entirely in their apartment 
(she is some sort of telemarketer while he is "allegedly" 
writing a play), and inside their bedroom, there is a growing 
corpse. As the drama progresses, the corpse grows until 
finally it bursts forth into the living room with the couple. 
However, this contradicts our sense of empirical laws: 
corpses do not grow.
It seems that this particular play does not satisfy 
the representation requirement. However, the representation 
requirement demands the following: that the artistic creation
5)
r^mmblm morne mmpeot of reelity. Thie connection between mrt 
end reality may be interpreted am symbolic; the word 
"remembie" doea not demand a literal connection: for example, 
the metaphor ham been given mtatum am an acceptable part of 
language. (A metaphor can be described am a variation of 
standard word usage to convey sort of connection between two 
ideas. This will be disouased in greater detail in Part 3.)
If metaphors are acceptable, then there is no longer any 
contradiction: in "Now To Get Rid Of It", the connection 
between art (the growing corpse) and reality (no empirical 
counterpart) is metaphorical. Therefore, the seemingly 
unrealistic aspect of the existential fiction is symbolic of 
an aspect of life, as opposed to graphically imitating that 
aspect.
Secondly, Valdes claims that language must be used 
according to the standards of regular usage. This does not 
seem to be the case with many pieces of existential fiction. 
The work of two popularised existential playwrights (which 
indicate that this is not the case for two separate reasons) 
will be examined. First, consider the use of language within 
Samuel Beckett's play "Nsiting for Oodot" (Lucky's speech):
LUCKY: Given the existence as uttered forth in the public 
works of Puncher and Wattmann of a personal Cod 
guaguaquagua with white beard guaguaguagua outside 
time without extension who from the heights of 
divine apathie divine athambia divine aphasia 
loves us dearly with some exceptions for reasons 
unknown but time will tell and suffers like the 
divine Miranda with those who for reasons unknown 
hut time will tell are plunged in fire whose fire 
flames if that continues and who can doubt it will 
fire the firmament that is to say blast hell to
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heaven so blue still and calm with a calm which 
even though intermittent is better than nothing 
but not so fast considering what is more that as a 
result of the labors left unfinished crowned by 
the Acacacacademy of. . .2 5
From this passage, it should be evident that normal syntax 
and a standard lexicon is not used. That is, the rules of 
grammar are not followed (i.e. there is no punctuation): much 
of a word's meaning is derived from its context. However, 
this is one of the points that the existentialists are 
highlighting: the use of language is not as infallible as we 
suspect. By miauaing language, they are using it 
metaphorically to signify its inadequacies: their misuse of 
language is a deliberate and stylised method used to 
illustrate a point. Therefore, the existential plays are not 
truly in contradiction with this requirement.
Related to this explanation is the claim that this 
nonsensical use of language actually depicts reality. It is 
claimed that in the ordinary world, the average conversation 
is bisarre. Harold Pinter's plays have been referred to as a 
"tape raoordiag" of conversation.** Consider his play, "The 
CeretaAer":
DAVXB8: Who was that feller?
ASTON : He's my brother.
DAVIB8: Is he? He's a bit of a joker, en'he?
ASTON : Uh.
DAVIES: Yes. . . he's a real joker.
ASTON i He's got a sense of humour,
DAVIES; Yes, I noticed.
[Pause.]
He's a real joker, that lad, you can see that.
[Pause.]
ASTON : Yes, he tends. . . he tends to see the funny side 
of things.
DAVIES: Nell, he's got a sense of humour, an'he?
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ASTON ; Ye#.
DAVIES: Ye#, you could tell that,*?
Pinter demonstrate# that pereon# not only mieuse language, 
but they also use it in a trivial manner; conversations do 
not necessarily progress in the neat orderly manner as 
depicted by the mainstream drama (as we labelled it earlier). 
That is, conversations are often aimless. Therefore, it is 
claimed that some of these dramas may depict a more accurate 
use of language. That is, real people do not conform to the 
standard usage of language. From one perspective, the 
existential dramatists employ language in such a manner so as 
to alert us to the inadequacies of language, and also, they 
may use language as it used in the everyday world and 
consequently, reveal the actual inadequacies and shatter our 
illusion of proper language usage.
Therefore, the existential fiction has the capacity 
to present knowledge and knowledge claims. Any claim that it 
does not present an accurate picture of reality is a 
misunderstanding of the material. It may be the case that a 
person does not agree with the perspective being presented by 




Like great worke, deep feelings always mean more than 
they are oonsoious of saying.
Albert camus, The Myth of Siayphua
In this section it will be determined if there any 
other features of drama which render it a bénéficiai means 
of expression for existentialists. It has already been noted 
that drama is an adeçuata means of expression for the 
existentialist: there is a mutual compatibility, and the 
dramatic form (as a play/fiction) also has the capacity to 
present knowledge. But, is there another quality whioh makes 
it a preferable ohoice? That is, if the decision to employ 
drama as a means of expression is justifiable, then it must 
not only be adequate, it must also be preferable. If it is 
not preferable, why decide to use it in the first place? That 
is, if the analytic form has everything there is to offer, 
then there is no reason to seek an alternate form.
It will be claimed that there are some additional 
features of drama that deem it a preferable means of 
expression for the existentialist. These features can be 
categorised as follows: practical, philosophical, and 
personal.
Prom a practical perspective, the history surrounding 
the theatre has contributed to its present status. If this 
present status of the theatre affects how drama is perceived, 
then this will factor into the existentialist's decision to 
employ drama.
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Firstly then, the history of drtms is extensive.
Where there has been humanity, there has been theatre or 
rather, drama, or so sociologists claim. The widely accepted 
claim is that theatre has its origin in religious rituals. 
These early dramatic performances would not be similar to the 
ones we experience today; frequently, there was not even an 
area designated as a stage, but it is important to recognise 
the history of drama: it has been an integral part of human 
culture from the beginning, whether it has been employed to 
express and/or explain ideas (as the Morality plays of the 
medieval era) or used for the sole (controversial) purpose of 
aesthetic gratifioaticn.** Therefore, the theatre is a 
significant part of culture.
Practical considerations are relevant since it has 
been claimed that existentialism is an applied philosophy.
If it is the task of the existentialist to somehow assist 
persons in discovering and/or maintaining their awareness, 
then the existentialist must access a method which has this 
capability. Sartre claims, “If a play is a success, the 
author reaches a wider public, for the time being at 
least.“30 It is also in this category that Sartre notes a 
difference which renders the drama superior to the novel; he 
claims,
K book gains its public gradually. A work in the theatre 
has necessarily to be “theatrical", because the author 
knows that the he will be applauded or hissed at once. A 
book can speak in a murmur, drama has to shout, like an 
assault on the public.
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Prom m practical perspective, the drama has a greater 
capacity to gain immediate attention than the novel. It 
should be noted though, that this same difference also grants 
a certain Imating quality to a well-written novel. However, 
if impact is the immediate goal, then the theatre is the 
route to take.
As an aside, it is interesting to note that Sartre 
was eager to work as a screenwriter and use film as a medium 
(which he eventually did). Hcwever, he noticed that film, as 
a medium, can direct the individual audience member more 
forcefully than the stage. That is, there is a direct focus 
in the film (which naturally accompanies a camera) whereas 
the stage still gives the individual audience member a degree 
of freedom to scan the whole set at random. Stage also has a 
live presence which activates problems with "the gsse"; this, 
according to Sartre, added to the overall "meaning" or the 
capacity to communicate of drama as a medium. Despite these 
considerations, Sartre still expressed a strong desire to use 
film in lieu of theatre.
Prom a philosophical perspective, the drama serves 
two functions: first, it is a physical illustration of an 
philosophical idea; and more importantly, this physical 
illustration is necessary to the existentialist ideas. "The 
problem of existence can have no significance if viewed 
impartially or in abstraction; it can only be seen in terms 
of the impact that experiences make on a particular 
existent.")* This is due to two reasons: the existential
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rwlation has a highly personal (and/or subjective) nature, 
and also, the existentialists emphasise the act of being.
That is, the existential revelation is not something whioh 
can necessarily be expressed in words. Therefore, a physical 
illustration is not merely desirable, but also a necessary 
means of indicating the phenomena.
Also, the personal perspective has been included in 
this argument. This may be interpreted as irrelevant, but if 
the existentialist is true to his philosophy then, it is 
relevant. That is, the existentialist makes his own choices 
and there is a notion that he must be true to his self. From 
a personal perspective, theatre is exciting, for the 
existential dramatist or any other for that matter. For 
example, Sartre states, "This may be what attracts me about 
the theatre: the assault and the heightened tone and the risk 
of losing everything in a single night. It forces me to speak 
in another way; it makes a change.")* With this statement, 
Sartre is referring to the limited run a show is given to 
prove itself worthy of a production; it either succeeds or it 
is dropped: guaranteed to get the adrenaline flowing,
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E. Conclusion
In conclusion then, the decision to employ an 
alternate means of expression is warranted. Moreover, the 
decision to employ drama has shown itself to be mutually 
beneficial. That is, the drama is better equipped than 
other forms to satisfy the needs of the existentialists: 
their philosophical points are well observed. Also, their 
contribution to the theatre has resulted in more "tlieatricai" 
techniques: the stress on meaninglessness (or arbitrary 
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Part 3: h Refutation of Con-Argument#
In conclusion then, at least some of the artistic 
forms are acceptable in the case of the existentialists. It 
has been demonstrated that at least two of the artistic forms 
(the novel and the drama) can create a successful union with 
existentialism; that is, there is a mutual compatibility, the 
final product has the capacity to convey knowledge in a 
beneficial manner for the existentialist, and also certain 
artistic forms possess certain other features (such as a live 
performance and also practical concerns) which deem them 
advantageous for the existentialist, and for what he wishes 
to convey. Therefore, the existential philosophies are 
properly and respectably expressed in certain artistic forms.
Yet, despite this justification, there are those who 
are unwilling to acknowledge artistic forms as a valid 
alternate to the analytic form: succinctly put, the 
artistic form pales in comparison (perhaps, even fades into 
oblivion) to the typical philosophical analytic form. This 
claim appears to be based on problems concerning the 
following: first, the manner in which artistic forms convey 
knowledge; and second, the identity and/or role of the 
literary artist in contrast with the identity and/or role 
of the philosopher.
The first problem can be divided into two separate 
parts: first, the process of the imagination; and second, the 
use of metaphors. That is, both imagination and metaphor
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utage are Integral parts of the literary artistic form, and 
unfortunately both raise epistemio problems. The second 
problem concerns the issue of stereotypical thinking and its 
influence upon cognitive capabilities.
Before these issues are addressed, a clarification 
concerning the terminology for this chapter will be made: the 
word "literature" will be used to refer jointly to the novel 
and the drama (unless either one is singled out), or more 
pointedly, the artistic forms that were justified as an 




To causa people to exercise their imagination is above 
all the task of the artist - especially the novelist and 
the dramatist.1
R.M. Hare, freedom and JReaaon
First, the process of imagination will be considered. 
Imagination can be defined as,
A form of mental activity held to be distinct from 
cognitive or rational processes; a free, creative 
ordering of the contents of the mind. Imagination in this 
sense is often confused with the production of mental 
imagery, which would be better called imaging.'*
This provides a basis; there is much debate as to what the 
actual role of the imagination is. (He will discuss this 
later.) This definition does present the crux of the problem 
with imagination: it is claimed as distinct from cognitive 
and rational processes, if it is distinct from cognitive and 
rational processes, then how can it produce "something" that 
can be classified as knowledge, in any epistemio sense? That 
is, there is an assumption that anything borne of the 
imaginative process is only figmental: imagination is not 
true. Conversely, there is a claim that knowledge necessarily 
comes from the cognitive and/or rational processes.
How, then, does this problem of imagination relate to 
artistic forms? It ia tempting to say that the content of 
artistic form is borne of the imagination. That is, the 
literary artist mentally develops an idea, or, in accordance 
with the definition, freely and creatively orders certain
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content#, mnd then eventually structure# this idea via his 
particular art form. For example, Beokett had an idea that, 
"iife Aa# no monniaw"* or that persons must establish their 
own sense of life (make their own meaning), or they will be 
endlessly waiting for something (the meaning of life) that 
does not exist, and he structured this in the form of a play, 
Waiting for Godot, In this play, two men. Estragon and 
Vladimir await an enigmatic third man called Godot who never 
arrives. They wait in Act I and they wait again in Act II. 
(During the first performances in Great Britain, the audience 
believed they were being fooled into watching the same play 
twice and many left during Act II.) However, there is no real 
Estragon or Vladimir and the whole story of their waiting is 
Beckett's concoction - it is not true. Therefore, it seems 
that this artistic form is dependent on the faculty of 
imagination.
If this is the case, then the following problem 
arises: artistic forms cannot produce knowledge. The argtunent 
has the following structure. Knowledge necessarily comes from 
the cognitive and rational processes; artistic forms are 
necessarily dependent on imagination, which, by analogy, 
becomes the source of knowledge; the process of imagination 
is distinct from both cognitive and rational processes; 
therefore the artistic form cannot produce knowledge.
Consider an illustration. The following scenario will 
be employed to exemplify the difference between cognitive 
and/or rational processes and the imagination process:
«7
Billy mtate#, "Amy had braids in her hair." Now suppose Billy 
is asked, "How do you know this?" If he responds by saying,
"X saw her this morning,", then the basis ot his statement is 
either cognitive or rational, consequently, it is knowledge. 
That is, the statement is the result of an observation. It is 
a report of a particular state of affairs; moreover, it can 
be verified (i.e. other witnesses can be produced, Amy can 
be asked, etc.). If, however, Billy responds with, "I 
imagined it.", then the basis of his statement is 
imagination, and consequently, it is not considered 
knowledge.
This example has raised the question of criteria fcr 
knowledge: namely, truth and verifiability. If these criteria 
for knowledge are acceptable, then imagination, to be a 
knowledge yielding process, must be able to satisfy them. It 
is argued that the imagination cannot satisfy these criteria, 
Mario J. Valdes states,
My colleagues from analytical philosophy would rule out 
the possibility that the imaginative configuration can 
make a serious truth-claim. Their argument is that the 
imaginative experience is non-falsifiable and also 
non-verifiable; therefore, it is not a truth-claim, for 
verifiability requires the possibility of confirmation, 
and thus, since any claim to truth on my own terms must 
be simultaneously a rejection of falsehood, the 
imaginative construct is neither true nor false.)
Aside from the verifiability problem, this passage also 
implies another problem of the imagination; that is, it is a 
product of the self alone, and this increases the problem of 
verifiability. That is, if the imagination is a creative,
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mtntal product of the eelf, then it eeeme that only that 
speoiflc eelf can "verify" the final product: have I created 
what I set out to do? However, this self-verification 
oertainly does not aid the verifiability problem.
Therefore, if these criteria are acceptable as 
conditions for knowledge claims, then the imagination faculty 
appears to have a problem. That is, knowledge has a truth 
condition and this in turn, has a verifiability condition. 
What is deemed knowledge is true, and what is deemed true can 
be verified. Products of the imagination do not seem to have 
either capacity.
Now that the problem of imagination has been 
explained, a solution can be addressed. To do this, the 
following must be demonstrated: first, that imagination has 
the capacity for truth, second, that products of the 
imagination can be verified, and consequently, that 
imagination is not as far removed from the cognitive and/or 
rational processes as the definition claims.
The first two points can be argued for jointly. That 
is, it is the connection between truth and verifiability that 
constitutes the knowledge claim, Therefore, by addressing the 
following two questions, a valuable distinction regarding 
this problem will be noted: first, what is the relation 
between the two? And second, what kind of method constitutes 
the verification of truth? That is, the verifiability 
criteria for the imagination may be different than what is 
normally expected for other processes that yield knowledge
«9
olmim#, such as aoiantiflo knowledge. Therefore, if it can 
be demonstrated that imagination does have eome sort of means 
of verifiability, then the problem no longer concerns us.
There are two notable responses: the claim that there 
is a necessary dependence of literary figures on non-literary 
figures, and also the idea posited by John Hospers: a 
fidelity to human nature. Although these responses are 
related (both are claiming there is a necessary relation to 
reality), they will be discussed separately, sinoe their 
details are distinct.
Firstly, there is a claim that there is a necessary 
connection between art and reality. That is, although 
imagination may be the cause or starting point of art, its 
truth can be verified in terms of its connection to reality. 
For example, there is a claim that literary characters sre 
derived from actual persons,4 it is important to note the 
actual figure may be a single person, or a composite, or even 
a synthesis of variety of persons. Therefore, as we saw in 
Part II, one of the standards for judging truth in literature 
is dependent on how accurately it mirrors reality.
This claim may serve to justify knowledge claims in 
literature, but, as was noted in Part II, it only serves 
literature classified as realism. It does not directly 
support the existential literature, sinoe some portrayals are 
not realistic. However, it is not the purpose of this thesis 
to justify the existentialist's particular usage of 
literature (that was discussed in Part 2). Hhat this argument
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do## acoomplish i# that truth-olaim# bas#d on imagination oan 
hav# a method or atandard of verification.
Beoondly, Hospers presents the idea of fidelity to 
human nature. This oan be explained in three claims: that 
there is a necessary iife eomponent within literature; that 
there is distinction between truth to and truth about; and 
lastly, the literary artist must possess a special insight. 
Although these claims have been separated, they can be 
discussed jointly* That is, the claims function together 
to support the idea; theoretically, they are distinct but, in 
practice, they are united.
Firstly, literature depicts life, and consequently, 
these depictions must be true to life. "Truth to" differs 
from "truth about": truth to refers to plausibility (with 
respect to perception and judgment) whereas truth about 
refers to facts about reality.* Consequently, the artist must 
be familiar with what he is creating: various aspects of the 
social life of human beings. Therefore, the literary artist 
must be acutely aware of his social environment, and 
hopefully, profoundly aware of the interior workings of other 
human beings.
The social dramatist must often have at his command a 
depth of insight and detail of facts such as would almost 
necessitate his being, in addition to a dramatic artist, 
a specialist in the field which he makes the subject- 
matter of his drama.*
That is, to accurately depict life situations, the artist 
must be knowledgeable of them: the popular adage is, "write
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¥hmt you /ruou". For example, if the artist is writing a story 
on the topic of abortion, then he must possess knowledge of 
the issue. Therefore, many of the situations presented in 
literature rely on the notion of how it is.
It oan be argued that Hooper's idea of fidelity to 
human nature is applicable to the existentialist's usage of 
literature. That is, the existentialist is depicting his 
logical conclusions regarding human nature, which ultimately 
entails that there is no human nature per so. Life is absurd 
(i.e. has no concrete or precise meaning). Therefore, if an 
existentialist piece of literature appears sometrtiat erratic, 
such as Eugene Ionesco's The Lesson (bare plot: a teacher 
kills forty students daily), this is only a metaphor of his 
claim as to what human nature is: unexplainable. The 
existentialist is claiming life is not orderly like the 
realist would have us believe. Therefore, in an important 
sense, the existentialist is exemplifying his interpretation 
of human fidelity.
If this is acceptable, then the following can be 
concluded: the knowledge claims within literature oan be 
verified, yet in a different manner. It is not the stringent 
verification method associated with the knowledge claims 
located in science. If this is the case, then the imagination 
is not as distinct from the cognitive and rational processes 
as previously suspected. That is, it, too, has the capacity 
for knowledge.
It can and has baen argued that there is a cognitive
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inmginêtion, and/or that imagination is part of tha overall 
cognitive proceaa. Thia will ba diacuaaed from two 
perapeotivea: a definition of thia cognitive aapect of the 
imagination, and alao, a practical application.
Baaically, thia view claima that the imagination ia a 
neoeaaary relation between experience and cognition. That 
ia, an experience ia perceived aa a collection of aenaationa; 
the imagination repreaenta the ability to aporadioally 
arrange theme aenaationa before they are eogniaed (i.e. 
placed in the univeraal categoriea). For, example, conaider 
that a peraon ham an experience of a dog: the collection of 
aenaationa may be thinga much aa color, aiae, relation, etc. 
Mia immediate reaponae aaaeaaee the aituation and pondéra any 
other posaibilitiea: could thia dog be other than it ia? At 
thia point, the cognitive proceaa atructurea the experience 
accordingly.
Much of theae ideaa on imagination are derived from 
the philoaophy of Immanuel Kant although the argument aa 
preaented haa been aynthesiaed (pun intended) with the ideaa 
of Paul Micoeur and Kenneth Dorter (who no doubt borrowed 
Kantian ideaa aa well). The point being introduced ia that 
Kant claimed there waa a reproductive and a productive 
imagination; the former indicating what ia now referred to aa 
imaging while the latter indicatea the ability to create new 
thoughta. However, it aeema unlikely that thia diatinction ia 
anything other than theoretical ; if the productive 
imagination ia capacity to create new thoughta, then from
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whmt i# it deriving its information? The reproductive 
imagination is the obvious answer.
This can be explained with an illustration: a person 
is strolling through the woods when he stumbles upon a river. 
He needs to cross it. To do this, he may ponder about all the 
previous means he has seen in the past as a crossing for 
rivers. This is his reproductive imagination. If none of 
these is available, he may access his productive imagination 
to determine a new method. However, in doing this, he is 
relying on the reproductive as a basis from which he will 
derive a new solution. Therefore, the productive imagination 
is ultimately dependent on the reproductive: its ability to 
reproduce reality and/or the experiences a person has 
encountered throughout his life.
Now it can be noted that the imagination is applied, 
from a practical perspective, for philosophic reasons. That 
is, within ethics, and meta-ethics, there are references to 
the imagination as an active tool. The consequentialist 
theories, for example, all require that the imagination be
activated to determine the outcome of an action.
The underlying problem with the imagination, then, 
appears to be that it oan be misused, as far as serious 
thinking endeavors are concerned. That is, imagination oan
be used for fantasies, and dreams, aside from imagining the
consequences of a moral action within an ethics debate. 
However, logic can also be misused: a valid argument can be 
false. The philosopher can be accused of being guilty of a
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case of apeoial pleading; it is wrong to imagine a pot of 
gold at the end of the rainbow, yet it is right to imagine 
that we are brains in vats. In conclusion then, there are 
different levels of the imagination, but ultimately, this is 
only a theoretical distinction. That is there is only one 
imagination but it possesses many abilities. To denounce it 
on the grounds that one of its abilities is questionable, is 
a logical contradiction. Without imagination, none of this 
would be possible. I* the philosopher wishes to claim that 
imagination cannot yield knowledge then it cannot rightly, be 
a tool within philosophic theory. Therefore the imagination 
is indispensable on the basis that it contributes to the 
production of knowledge both actively and passively.
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B. Metaphor
To draw attention to a philosopher's metaphor's is to 
belittle him - like praising a logician for his beautiful 
handwriting.?
Max Black, "Metaphor"
Since a metaphor is a technique which permeates 
literature, its affect on the capacity to yield knowledge 
must be considered. As is indicated in the above citation, 
philosophers are suspect of the use of metaphors in general, 
let alone in artistic form. Regardless, the technique is a 
favorite in literature, and can also be very potent.
Existential literature is not an exception. Aside 
from the standard use of metaphors within their literature 
(such as Oarein's famous line in Uo Exit: "Hell is other 
people"), some pieces of their literature can also be 
classified as metaphors (it is a large and expansive family) 
and/or extended metaphors. For example. Franc Kafka's, The 
Trial: this novel can be considered as an extended metaphor 
of the interaction type. Therefore, there will be no precise 
translation which would accurately replace the value 
presented in the novel. But, loosely, this novel can be 
interpreted as an existential question of locating meaning in 
one's life; that is, if one had to justify one's actions, how 
would one do so? How could one justify both the trivial and 
the sublime aspects of one's life, or even determine which is 
which? In this novel then, a man's life is "on triai".
Therefore, as was noted in the Imagination section,
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the metaphor ha# ooneiderable importance for the artiet 
and/or exiatentialiat. Consequently, it muet be regarded a 
legitimate means of oommunioation in its own right, otherwise 
the existentialist is discredited.
The original definition of a metaphor is roughly as 
follows: a comparison between two unliko objecte without 
using the words "like" or "as". However, this was considered 
inadequate for two reasons: first, it incorrectly enqphasises 
the notion of comparison; and second, it does not necessarily 
occur between two objects.
The metaphor is not always based on the notion of 
comparison, nor is it always between two objects, it has a 
greater range. That is, a metaphor may be used within the 
context of a verb as well. For example, "He danced around 
the answer." Regarding the form of the metaphor. Max Black 
states, "some words are used metaphorically, while the 
remainder are used non-metaphoricaily."» The words which are 
used metaphorically, ho entitled the focus, and the non- 
metaphorical: the frame. Black also claims that the metaphor 
can have at least three classifications: substitution, 
comparison, and interaction (previously mentioned).
Briefly then, a substitution metaphor refers to 
those metaphors in which there is a literal translation. For 
example, "Billy is an angel." can be easily interpreted as 
"Billy is a good boy." That is, these metaphors are so widely 
used that they are readily understood and acknowledged. A 
comparison metaphor claims there is an underlying similarity
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between the objects mentioned. For example, "Billy is a 
glacier." can be interpreted as "Billy is an emotionally 
frigid person." That is, these metaphors are explained in 
terms of how the salient features of the focus reflect upon 
the iramm. Lastly, the interaction metaphor claims that 
there is an extended meaning due tc the implied relation 
between the concepts presented. For example, "Billy is a 
tongueless Jesus." cannot be adequately expressed in normal 
language usage; the attempt can be made but something 
ineffable is lost in the translation.*
With these distinctions in mind, the following as a 
basic definition of a metaphor will be offered: the 
application of a term (s) to another term (s) to which it is 
not literally applicable. (It can be argued that this 
applies to the verb metaphors as well: the metaphor can be 
perceived as a relation to the verb, or the action indicated 
in the statement.) Now that a working definition of a 
metaphor has been established, the problem it directly causes 
for this thesis oan be approached.
Chiefly, the metaphor is problematic on two levels: 
first, there is a concern regarding a correct translation or 
meaning, and second, there is also a related problem of 
speaker/author intention. If these inadequacies of the 
metaphor are valid, then this is a strike against the thesis 
of this paper: the existentialist would be relying on 
inadequate means of expression. However, if these 
inadequacies can be refuted, at least in the case of the
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#%i#tentialiat and hla use of literature, than thaaa problem# 
will no longer be of concern.
Piret, metaphors do not obtain meaning the same way 
most terms or phrases do; that is, its meaning is not derived 
according to the standard usage of language. That is, the 
word "cat" ordinarily means feline; however, in a metaphor, 
this definition would change.
Consider an example within existential literature. We 
will use the famous line previously cited: the character 
Oarcin states "Hell is other people*" (No JVsif)&o How do we 
know what the meaning is? Interpreted via literal means, 
this statement is nonsensical: from a semantic perspective, 
it is meaningless. That is, "hell" is not other people; 
"hell" is a concept of eternal damnation. Therefore, the 
metaphor necessarily requires some sort of translation,
This is what Max Black was addressing in his 
categories of metaphor types. While the substitution and 
comparison theories may adequately explain the meanings of 
the type of metaphors they indicate, the meaning of the 
interaction metaphor remains elusive, (It should be noted 
that this does not mean that the metaphor is not understood} 
only that a precise or literal meaning cannot be 
established.)
Second, one solution to the first problem is to 
analyse speaker intention; that is, an examination of what 
the speaker intended may reveal a meaning. However, this 
fails on two accounts: first, speaker intention is not always
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mvmilmble; #nd m#oomd, o#m b# of##t*d without
intention. While the firet misgiving refers to • problem with 
practicality, the second refers to a deeper rift between the 
philosopher and the artist,
. . .  a metaphor need only be extrinsically related to 
what it symbolises (an owl is not wist , so artists may 
know how to make conqpelling metaphors without 
understanding the intrinsic nature of the particular 
kinds of things from which they make the metaphor.ii
Therefore, there is a claim that the artist may or may not be 
genuine in his intentions. That is, there is no discernible 
way to determine if the artist is aware of the implications 
of his metaphor: the connection may be a fluke.
The crux of the problem related to metaphors then 
is: it causes an unclarity and impedes the possibility of 
obtaining one precise meaning. Therefore, the ability for a 
reasonable arguixent is also impeded; a common ground may or 
may not be established. That is, the underlying idea cannot 
be evaluated if it cannot be agreed upon. Therefore, sinoe 
metaphor increases the probability of a misconstrued idea, it 
is not a useful technique in philosophic discussion.
This problem can be refuted on the basis of two 
arguments : first, it contains an unnecessary presupposition 
and second, the use of metaphors is compatible with 
the existential philosophies.
First, the desire for a precise meaning has begs the 
question, it presupposes that there is a precise meaning.
This may or may mot be the case: that is, some ideas
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encapsulated within a metaphor may not poaaeaa a precise 
meaning. For example, consider the case o£ catachresis; a 
metaphor may be coined to express an idea which is missing 
from the vocabulary. Or, a metaphor may also be a deliberate 
tool of ambiguity; that is, a metaphor may intend to have a 
plethora vf meanings (contrary or compatible), each one being 
equally valid, h metaphor may be a short cut for indicating 
a vast array of ideas.
Second, the desire to obtain a precise meaning is 
not necessarily compatible with the existential philosophies. 
That is, according to the existentialist, the truth is 
subjective. Therefore, the presupposition that there is a 
precise meaning is not in accordance with the content of the 
existential philosophies: the existentialist claims that 
existence precedes essence. Therefore, essence is self- 
created. Consequently, there is no one simple equation. 
Therefore, the use of metaphors does not conflict with the 
existential philosophies; if a metaphor is unable to produce 
one precise meaning, then this is consistent with the content 
of the existential philosophies.
•1
C. statut of the Literary Artiet
The metaphyeioian believe# that he travel# ia territory 
in which truth and faltehood are at atake. In reality, 
however, he ha# not aeeerted anything, but only eapreeaed 
himtelf, like an artiet.i*
Rudolph Carnap, fiimiiiafien of Jfefaphyeic#
Before thia argument i# begun, tome terminology will 
be clarified: the word "pbiloBophor*’ will be employed 
abetractly and aomewhat vaguely. That ia, it will be uaed to 
refer to thoae in the diaoipline who are oppoaed to the 
theaia of thia paper, and alao oppoaed to any affiliation 
with art and or the artiet. In thia aeotion then, a 
philoaopher will repreaent the peraon with platonic 
tendeneiea, or more recently, with analytic tendenoiea. The 
exiatentialiat, naturally, will be exempt from thia label for 
thia aeotion. Alao, the word, "arfiat" will refer to 
literary artiata.
In regard to the atatua of the literary artiet, there 
ia aome oonfuaion aa to what hi# proper role in aooiety 
actually ia. Thia oonfuaion can be diaaected into the 
following area#! a gueation of compatibility with the role of 
the philoaopher; a problem with atereotypical thinking; the 
philoaopher'# deaire to be diatinot from the artiet.
Firatly, what or who ia the artiet? That ia, ia he 
equipped with a apeoial aort of intelligence or ia he juat a 
fluke with eloquence? More pointedly: ia he an entertainer 
or a aoholar? There ia a deaire to categorise him aa one or
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th# other; thii categorisation affecta hie oompaiibilitf with 
the role of the philoaopher. An entertainer will be defined 
ea, one who amuaea, although not neoeaaarlly with humor. A 
aoholar will refer to one who doea "authoritative reaearch 
end writing in aome apeoial field".
Now the problem concerning which category beat 
deacribea the artiet muat atill be addreaaed. Hia problematic 
identity ia captured in the following paaaage,
On the one hand poeta can be aeen aa figure# privilege 
and reverence, the poaaeaaora of apeoial inaighta and 
conacience, . . On the other they may be regarded aa 
relatively unimportant functionariea in the aocial body - 
amuaing, perhapa even charming, but in the end ornamental 
figurea uaeful to awell a progreaa, atart a acene or 
two.'14
Thia diatinction ia important to the debate: that ia, if the 
philoaopher ia undeniably a aoholar, then he cannot be an 
entertainer for it oontradicta hia poaitlon. Therefore, if 
the artiat ia claaaified aa an entertainer, then the 
philoaopher cannot rightly be affiliated with auch a 
poaitlon.
However, thia may he a caae of bifuroêtion. That ia, 
the fallacy of "considering a diatinction or classification 
exclusive and exhaustive when other alternatives exist."i& 
That ia, there are at least two other possibilities: first, 
there ia the possibility of shared qualities, and second, 
there is alao the possibility of multiple roles.
First, the philoaopher and the artist may very well 
share a certain number of qualities. To return to the
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entert&iner/aoholar distinction: an entertainer may be 
scholarly and likewise, a scholar may be entertaining. Hhat 
is being noted is the distinction between, for example, jssx 
music and jaMsy music. However, if the tension between 
artists and philosophers is as steep as it appears to be, 
then the word 'artistic' may very well become pejorative, as 
far as philosophers are concerned. That ia, to call a 
philoaopher artistic may be viewed as degrading the quality 
of hia work.
The second alternative offers a stronger solution. 
That is, it ia not a logical necessity that a person satisfy 
the criteria for one role and one role only: persons may 
occupy many roles simultaneously. Therefore, the role of the 
literary artist may very well be multifarious: he may be 
philosopher, entertainer, and scholar, as well as holding 
several other roles. Consequently, any categorisation would 
have to reflect this.
This introduces the problem of stereotypicsl 
thinking. This can be defined as a hasty greneraiisation that 
becomes fixed: it is a tendency to generalize and abstract 
from experiences and conclude that this generalization is 
right. This tendency inevitably focuses on any salient 
features which then become the norm. This is considered to 
be a cognitive capacity; that is, it is a method of 
catégorisation,!* Although a method of categorization may be 
necessary to process knowledge, when this categorisation 
reaches the level of stereotypical thinking, it is
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problMMtio: "They ere not eeelly undermined, because they 
are often accurate, at least to some extent. They function 
as cluster concepts, so that the reality component at their 
core lends them an unwarranted credibility."i?
That is, a stereotype is a fixed idea, based on these 
salient features, whether actual or supposed. For example, a 
person may have the belief that Cape Bretoners are friendly 
(based on the fact that he met three Cape Bretoners and they 
were amicable), yet he meets another Cape Bretoner who is not 
friendly: he dismisses this in favor of the fact that this 
person has lived elsewhere for a number of years. Therefore, 
the person expects the salient features to be present, and 
also, refuses to accept the incident as that particular 
category without these features.
As a result, then, this process can impede the 
ordinary cognitive capabilities; a person becomes accustomed 
to thinking in a certain manner, and the claim is, this 
affects his perception. By analogy then, it is reasonable to 
claim that this philosopher/artist identity problem has been 
subjected to this process of stereotyping. That is, Thomas 
Oilovioh reports that even the educated fall prey to this 
tendency.1# It is being claimed that this tendency has 
contributed to the artist/philosopher identity problmtn in the 
following manner: there is a belief that a person can only 
have one occupational role, at least, at any one time.
The argument can be formulated rather simply in the 
following manner. As a career, an artist is deemed to be
•5
completely enveloping; that ie, it integrally oooupiea the 
individual. In support o£ this, there is a popular notion 
that the artist reveals the «oui of a nation.!* Likewise, as 
a career, the philosopher also represents a very devoted 
occupation. Therefore, the conclusion of this stereotypical 
thinking can be voiced as: how can any person possibly juggle 
the responsibilities of both? That is, if a person makes 
such an attempt, then one of these careers is bound to 
suffer. Therefore, as long as both are perceived as distinct 
and time-consuming occupations, there will be a problem 
related to stereotypical thinking.
However, these problems are necessarily related to 
the core belief that the philosopher and the artist are 
distinct and time-consuming occupations. That is, the 
phenomenon of stereotypical thinking can only contribute to 
the rift if this core belief is held. There are those who 
believe that these two share virtually equivalent roles. This 
converse belief is necessary to the philosopher/artist 
identity problem. Consider this question: why is there a 
refutation in the first place? That is, if the two are truly 
distinct, why was there ever a need to construct an argument 
indicating that distinction?
At some point, the philosopher felt inclined to 
distinguish between himself and the artist. This is curious: 
why not present an argument for the distinction between a 
philosopher and a psychologist? Camus claims that, "It would 
be impossible to insist too much on the arbitrary nature of
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th# former oppoeitlon between art and philoaophy."20 prom 
thia, we oan derive two claima: firat, that there muat be an 
underlying aimilarity between the artiat and the philoaopher 
(otherwiae there would be no need to offer an argument for 
diatinction), and aecond, that the philoaopher felt inclined 
to aever thia connection.
The underlying aimilarity between the artiat and the 
philoaopher ia two-fold: from a philoaophio perapeotive, 
they are engaged in aimilar taaka; and from practical 
perapeotive, they produce aimilar effecta.
Both artiat and philoaopher are engaged in creating 
and/or developing thought. Camua claima, "The philoaopher, 
even if he ia Kant, ia a creator. He haa hia oharaotera, hia 
aymbola, and hia aeoret action. He haa hia plot endinga," and 
then, in oompariaon with the artiat, he offera, "The novel 
haa ita logic, ita reaaoning, ita intuition and ita 
poatulate. It alao haa ita requirementa of clarity."21 
Therefore, both aeek to eatabliah or promote aome ayatem of 
thought.
Secondly, both oan produce aimilar effecta; that ia, 
both have the capacity to affect the aocial climate and to 
influence the mindaet of the individual. Pointedly, they 
accompliah thia via aimilar methoda: they write aomething 
created by their minda. Therefore, in the eyea of the general 
public, it can be argued that the two are aimilar. Thia ia 
reflected in language uaage: people refer to being we/i read 
aa advantageoua.
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Who then, initiated the distinction and began the 
rift which has resulted in the identity problem? It seems 
that Plato had a great deal to do with the development of 
this mindset. However, if the philosopher had cause to 
distinguish himself from the artist, then it seems that this 
stems from his desire to not be perceived as a simplê 
storyteller.
For, if the stereotypical thinking problem holds 
true, then it would not be in the best interest of someone 
like A.J. Ayer to be regarded in the same light as someone 
like Stephen King. But, as Camus so notes, it is not fair to 
hold bad writers (i.e. such as the 'simple' storyteller who 
does not possess the intellect of the philosopher) as 
exemplars of the discipline.** For if this was the case, then 
the same could be done to philosophers.
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D. Conoluaion
In the end then, it eeeme that the exletenti*liet ie 
juetified in hie ueage of ertietic forme, in particular, hie 
ueage of the drama. The artietic form hae been ehown to meet 
the requirementa of philoaophy and perhapa more important1y, 
it hae been ehown to be advantageoua to the exietentlal 
philoeophiee. It eeeme that one of the Crimea of the 
exiatentialiat*e waa re-initiating the philoaopher/artiat 
identity problem. That ia, the philoaopher had been elowly 
detaching himaelf from any eerioua connection with the artiat 
when the exiatentialiat exploded onto the acene with hia 
hybrid ideaa, which, aa it turna out, happened to be well 
founded. Thanka to the likea of Jean-Paul Sartre, a man who 
regrettably believed that crayfiah followed him around,** the 
identity problem waa powerfully re-inatated.
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When this work was conceived, the validity of the 
existentialist's choice to employ an alternate means of 
communication for his philosophy was being contemplated. 
Whereas other modern philosophers employ a direct, almost 
analytic, approach to their writings, the existentialist 
commonly engages in fiction or personalised accounts of lived 
experiences. Typically, the modern philosopher attempts to 
exude the qualities of the objective scientist, while the 
existentialist proclaims that he oan think only in human 
terms. To express all of this, the existentialist chose 
different vehicles of expression. How much of this is 
justified?
In this work then, three tasks have been accomplished 
which support the following conclusion: the existential 
philosopher is justified in using an alternate means of 
expression, namely, the literary arts, to communicate his 
philosophy.
Firstly, in Part One, a working, albeit general, 
definition of the existential philosophies was established.
It was claimed that existentialism is a philosophy of 
existence, revolving around the experiential aspects of the 
individual person. The characteristics of existentialism were 
divided into ttro categories: logical implications of the main 
tenet, "existence precedes essence"; and second, a more 
personalised look at how the individual address/confronts the
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first category. Whore#* the first category claims that the 
individual is free and self-created, the second category 
claims that such a revelation can, does, or will overwhelm 
the individual. Although the individual is free and acts of 
his own accord, he may not always choose to believe so.
By establishing this working definition of the 
existential philosophies, and then, in Part Two, a general 
definition of literary artistic forms, certain degrees of 
compatibility and also necessity were demonstrated. This is 
a necessary demonstration if the union (between the 
existential philosophies and literary artistic forms) is to
be possible in the first place. If the two forms were not
compatible with each other, then the query is no more. Once 
it was established that this union was possible, then it was
possible to address the major concerns regarding such a
union.
Secondly, in Part Two, as already mentioned, the 
issue of various literary artistic forms was addressed. Two 
of the more commonly used literary forms were examined, the 
novel and the drama, and the latter was the focus. To 
demonstrate a compatibility with the generic definition of 
the existential philosophies, three things were provided: 
first, a working definition of these literary artistic forms, 
second, the capacity to convey knowledge (as far as the 
existential philosophies are concerned) within these literary 
artistic forms, and finally, any other beneficial qualities . 
that these forms may be able to offer the existentialist,
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such «8 practical and personal concerns. It was concluded 
that these literary artistic forms (in particular, the drama) 
are both compatible and advantageous for the expression of 
the existential philosophies. Fiction has a capacity to 
convey knowledge, and also, it has a number of other 
qualities, such as practical concerns, which are beneficial 
to the expression of the existential philosophies. In 
conclusion, the drama was chosen as the best possible vehicle 
for the existentialist. This decision was largely due to the 
existentialist's emphasis on experience; the existential 
revelation may often be somewhat ineffable. This is further 
supported by the existentialist's belief that language may 
not always adequately describe a given situation. 
Consequently, a learned experience becomes preferable to a 
taught experience, and drama can provide this. Drama can 
successfully present an attitude or create the feeling which 
corresponds to an idea; the existentialist can and does, make 
use of this characteristic.
Finally, in Part Three, the chief complaints against 
the employment of literary artistic forms (i.e. imagination, 
metaphor, and the status of the literary artist) were 
acknowledged and disputed. The use of imagination has been 
considered questionable due to its inability to produce 
knowledge; however, it has been shown that this is not the 
case. Imagination can very easily be placed into the 
knowledge process; it may also be a necessary part of this 
process. T^e issue of metaphor usage has been criticised for
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Its difficulty in determining e precise meaning* However, it 
has been also noted that such a feature is compatible with 
the existential philosophies. If these philosophies advocate 
the lack of a "precise" meaning, then the metaphor becomes an 
advantageous, if not necessary, form of expression. Lastly, 
the questionable status of the literary artist was addressed: 
where does the artist fit into the scheme of things? It has 
been demonstrated how this may be ^ue to a process of 
stereotypical thinking, and/or a tendency to generalize and 
categorize.
In light of all this, then, a reasonable 
justification of certain literary artistic forms as an 
alternate means of philosophic expression for the 
existentialist has been presented. Due to the particular 
nature of his philosophy and the nature of the literary 
artistic forms, the existentialist is well within his rights 
to choose this method of expression.
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